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Abstract
Industrial control systems are critical to the operation of industrial facilities, especially
for critical infrastructures, such as refineries, power grids, and transportation systems. Similar
to other information systems, a significant threat to industrial control systems is the attack
from cyberspace—the offensive maneuvers launched by “anonymous” in the digital world that
target computer-based assets with the goal of compromising a system’s functions or probing for
information. Owing to the importance of industrial control systems, and the possibly devastating
consequences of being attacked, significant endeavors have been attempted to secure industrial
control systems from cyberattacks. Among them are intrusion detection systems that serve as
the first line of defense by monitoring and reporting potentially malicious activities. Classical
machine-learning-based intrusion detection methods usually generate prediction models by learn-
ing modest-sized training samples all at once. Such approach is not always applicable to industrial
control systems, as industrial control systems must process continuous control commands with
limited computational resources in a nonstop way. To satisfy such requirements, we propose using
online learning to learn prediction models from the controlling data stream. We introduce several
state-of-the-art online learning algorithms categorically, and illustrate their efficacies on two
typically used testbeds—power system and gas pipeline. Further, we explore a new cost-sensitive
online learning algorithm to solve the class-imbalance problem that is pervasive in industrial
intrusion detection systems. Our experimental results indicate that the proposed algorithm can
achieve an overall improvement in the detection rate of cyberattacks in industrial control systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern industrial control systems are microprocessor-equipped devices and associated
communication networks used to monitor and operate physical equipment in the industrial
environment. Such systems are designated to collect sensor measurements and operational
data from the physical world, display information to human operators, perform decisions
based upon the detected events, and issue control commands to the controlled equipment.
The commands are used to turn on or off power switches, open or close hydraulic valves,
adjust motor speed, shut down engines in emergencies, etc. Although such operations are
routine, they are crucial in industrial processes as any misoperation can cause incidents
that may lead to devastating consequences in terms of financial loss, acute health ef-
fects, or environmental impacts. Modern digit-controller-based industrial control systems
exhibit many advantages compared to their predecessors such as mechanical-based and
electromechanical-based systems in terms of performance, reliability, and cost. In fact,
modern industrial control systems have been applied widely in practice, and are the de-
facto standard configuration of almost every industrial sector.
Figure 1 shows a notional topology of an industrial control system. As shown, the
sensors measure physical quantities (e.g., flow, pressure, speed) and convert them into
signals that are transmitted to the controllers. The controllers process the sensor signals
2Fig. 1: Notional topology of an industrial control system.
to generate manipulated variables that are sent to the actuators (e.g., breakers, switches,
valves) to manipulate the controlled process directly. Sensors, actuators, and controllers,
together with some external components such as human machine interfaces (HMIs) and
remote maintenance tools compose a typical industrial control system. Regarding the actual
implementation of the system, many variants exist and their boundaries can be blurry.
Still, there are several types of widely used control systems, such as supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [1], distributed control systems (DCSs) [2], and
programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Specifically, a SCADA system comprises a control
center, and one or more geographically distributed field sites consisting of PLCs and/or
remote terminal units (RTUs) used to command actuators and sensors. It is generally
used to control geographically dispersed assets. A DCS, by contrast, is always applied
to control production systems within a local area using the supervisory and regulatory
control mechanism. As for PLCs, except for serving as the local controllers in SCADA
and DCS configurations, they can also be implemented as the primary controllers in some
smaller control systems to provide closed-loop control with no direct human involvement.
For details about SCADA, DCS, PLC, and other types of control systems, refer to Stouffer
et al. [3].
Industrial control systems are critical to the operation of industrial facilities, particularly
to national critical infrastructures, such as refineries, chemical plants, electrical power grids,
oil and natural gas pipelines, and transportation systems. Their incidents can cause signifi-
cant risk to human lives and serious damage to the environment. Industrial control systems
3had been thought to be immune to outsider threats because they were originally designed
as isolated systems running proprietary control protocols using specialized hardware and
software. This could be true in the past, but is no longer applicable nowadays. Modern
industrial control systems do not operate in isolation anymore, but tend to be connected to
wider networks (e.g., Internet, Internet-of-things [4], sensor networks [5], [6], smart grid
systems [7]–[9], cloud systems [2], communication systems [10]–[13], corporate networks
[14]–[17], and mobile social networks [18]). The proprietary protocols once unfamiliar to
the public are gradually being replaced by open standards such as the Ethernet, TCP/IP
[19], [20], and web services. The merging of typical information technologies into industrial
control systems reduces the dubious protective barrier of “security by obscurity”, and thus
increases the possibility of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and incidents [21]–[24]. In fact,
cyberattacks to industrial control systems have occurred at an alarming pace in the last
decade. Recent records include Stuxnet, Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, Maroochy in Australia,
Flame, and Aurora [3].
Among the recent cyberattacks is the famous Stuxnet worm known for its unverified but
highly possible intent to compromise Iran’s nuclear program. Uncovered in 2010, Stuxnet is
the first identified malware that targets SCADA systems [25]. It is believed to be introduced
to Iran’s industrial sites via an infected USB flash drive. Subsequently, it propagates
across the network using Microsoft Windows flaws. Stuxnet’s spread is indiscriminate,
but its attack is designated to target only Siemens S7-300 PLC systems with particular
variable frequency drives (VFD) attached. In particular, it monitors the frequency of motors
controlled by VFD, and only attacks systems that spin between 807 Hz and 1210 Hz. The
industrial applications of motors with these parameters include high-speed centrifuges that
are essential for uranium enrichment. Stuxnet periodically modifies the frequency of VFD,
and thus causes the rotational speed of connected motors to change in an unusual manner.
It fakes the sensor signal to monitor systems, rendering the deed unbeknownst to human
operators. Consequently, the fast-spinning centrifuges become destabilized initially and
finally break down. Such sophisticated plots, together with the unprecedented complexity
of the code, strongly suggest that Stuxnet is not a hacker’s sabotage, but a state-sponsored
cyberattack. Because Stuxnet’s design is not domain specific, it could be tailored as a
platform for attacking any SCADA or PLC system. This is proven by a number of new
worms found subsequently, considered to be related to Stuxnet.
The recognition of Stuxnet has intensified the public’s awareness of the information
security of industrial control systems. However, securing them is not easy. Owing to
their long life span, legacy systems with great vulnerability are still active currently. It
is not unusual for outdated devices without security patch to be manipulated by unalerted
technicians in industrial sites. Because of the real-time, continuity, and constrained environ-
ment of the industrial control system, many methods used in traditional computer security
(such as virus database update) are difficult to apply. As incidents and malicious actions
are inevitable, detecting their occurrences timely is important to industrial control system
administrators, and automatic devices such as firewalls and anti-virus software. This can
be achieved by adapting solutions for traditional information technology environments to
develop industrial-control-system-specific intrusion detection systems.
Artificial-intelligence-based approaches such as machine learning have been employed
widely by intrusion detection systems. Among various machine learning methods, online
learning represents a family of efficient algorithms that can build the predictor incrementally
by processing the training data in a sequential manner, as opposed to batch learning
4algorithms that train the predictor by learning the entire dataset all at once [26]. Specifically,
online learning algorithms perform on a sequence of data by processing them one by one.
On each round, the learner receives an input, makes a prediction using an internal hypothesis
that is retained in memory, and subsequently learns the true label. It uses the new example
to modify its hypothesis according to some predefined rules. The goal is to minimize the
total number of rounds with incorrect predictions. In general, online learning algorithms are
fast, simple, and require few statistical assumptions, rendering them applicable to a wide
range of applications. They can scale well to a large amount of data, and are particularly
suitable for real-world applications where data arrive continuously.
We herein study the problem of detecting cyberattacks in industrial control systems using
online learning algorithms. We evaluate several state-of-the-art online learners in terms
of their ability to identify malicious control commands from normal ones using testbeds
provided by the Critical Infrastructure Protection Center of the Mississippi State University.
The experimental results on a power system and a gas pipeline testbed indicate that online
learning algorithms can discriminate the intrusions effectively. Furthermore, we focus on
the so-called class-imbalanced problem that troubles most intrusion detection systems in
real-world applications: relatively large numbers of normal events exist that can easily
overwhelm a few attacks and distract classifiers. To address the class-imbalanced problem,
we propose a cost-sensitive online learning method, namely the adaptive regularized cost-
sensitive multiclass online learning, such that the classifier can focus on the minority
classes that are more important. The proposed algorithm is a combination of the second-
order online learning technique and the cost-sensitive learning approach. It differs from
traditional multiclass online learners who are only concerned about the performance in
terms of prediction mistake rate by taking the misclassification costs into consideration. We
demonstrate experimentally that the proposed algorithm can discriminate attacks precisely
and efficiently.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related work
on industrial control system security. Section III begins with an introduction to classical
online learning algorithms. Subsequently, our adaptive regularized cost-sensitive multiclass
online learning algorithm is presented. Section IV gives experimental results and discussion.
Section V concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, industrial control system security has garnered increasing attention,
particularly that pertaining to critical infrastructures. Several academic studies have been
performed to understand the characteristics of industrial control systems, analyze their
vulnerabilities to cyberattacks, simulate real systems with testbeds, and demonstrate the
importance of cybersecurity in industrial control systems. Ca´rdenas et al. [27] discussed
the differences between the security of control systems and traditional IT systems, and
analyzed the reasons for the current control systems being more vulnerable than before
to cyberattacks. Companies, organizations, and government agencies are involved in the
industrial control system security initiatives as well, primarily in the form of publishing
guidelines, standards, and best practices. As an example, the U.S. National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) published a number of guidances to cybersecurity risk
management, among which is the NIST Special Publication 800-82 providing cross-industry
guidelines for securing industrial control systems [3]. This publication highlights the typical
5threats and vulnerabilities to these systems and provides the recommended the security
countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks. In addition to the guidance to cross
industry, there are a number of publications targeting specific industries such as chemical,
oil and gas. The surveys of such guidance, together with methodologies for measuring and
managing threats, can be found in [28], [29].
Most of the conventional methods for protecting control systems have focused on in-
creasing their reliability and maintainability. However, an urgent growing concern has
emerged for protecting control systems against attacks launched in cyberspace. To detect
such attacks, one can rely on the profile of anomaly patterns [30]–[33]. As an example,
Carcano et al. [30] proposed an intrusion detection method for SCADA system based on
tracking the so-called critical states that correspond to dangerous or unwanted situations in
the monitored system. Their approach assumed that cyberattacks are always performed by
forcing a transition of the system from a safe state to a critical state. Because the critical
states are generally well known and limited in number, one can enumerate them formally
beforehand and predict the criticality by tracking the changes in the distance between the
current system state and the critical states. Likewise, Pan et al. [31] processed a sequence
of critical system states using a sequential pattern mining algorithm to detect disturbances
and cyberattacks in power systems. In contrast to exploiting the abnormal patterns, one
can also specify the acceptable behaviors of a system, and subsequently detect attacks that
cause violation to them [34], [35]. The so-called specification-based intrusion detection
approach monitors the system according to policies specified by valid sequences of system
behaviors. Any sequence of behaviors outside the predefined specifications is regarded as
an abnormal behavior. As a representative work, Cheung et al. [34] presented three model-
based detection techniques for monitoring SCADA networks: (1) specifying the expected
characteristics of network request/response according to the Modbus protocol; (2) defining
the expected communication patterns among network components; and (3) detecting the
changes in server/service availability.
The aforementioned rule-based intrusion detection methods generally rely on human
efforts to transform expert knowledge into machine-executable rules. Manually constructing
such rules, however, can be a laborious and expensive endeavor. Machine learning based
methods prevail in this situation as they can automatically generate rules from the existing
examples without human efforts. For performance testing, Beaver et al. [36] evaluated
several classical machine learning algorithms including the decision tree, naı¨ve Bayes clas-
sifier, and support vector machine (SVM) in terms of their ability to identify cyberattacks
using a dataset of RTU communications in a gas pipeline system. A similar evaluation was
performed on a power system to demonstrate the feasibility of applying machine learning
algorithms to discriminate types of power system disturbances, especially those caused
by malicious attacks [37]. Terai et al. [38] built a discriminant model between a normal
operation and attack packets on a laboratorial fluid system equipped with an actual industrial
controller using SVM with packet transmission intervals and length as features. Schuster
et al. [39] applied the one-class classification technique to implement a self-configuring
anomaly detection for industrial network data. They identified the one-class SVM as a
promising learning method for this task, as no sample of attacks or other anomalous
traffic is required to construct the training set. Other classical intrusion detection methods
employing machine learning techniques include exemplar-based classifier (e.g., [40]), k-
nearest neighbors (e.g., [41], [42]), neural network (e.g., [43], [44]), SVM (e.g., [43]–[45]),
6and naı¨ve Bayes (e.g., [46]). Sommer et al. [47] identified a few unique challenges and
corresponding guidelines regarding the use of machine learning for anomaly detection in a
general network environment. Mantere et al. [48] narrowed down the scope from general
networks to industrial control systems, and argued that the diversity of network traffic,
while prevails in general networks and tends to disturb machine learning algorithms, is
decreased significantly in industrial control systems. They thus considered machine learning
a promising tool for intrusion detection in industrial control systems.
III. ONLINE LEARNING FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
A. Problem Setting
We tackle the intrusion detection problem with supervised machine learning techniques.
Specifically, the task of detecting malicious actions from normal actions can be cast as
a binary classification problem, in which we use a positive class to denote the malicious
actions, and a negative class for the normal actions. To further distinguish malicious action
types, the task can be transformed into a multiclass classification problem. To learn a
classifier with machine learning techniques, a training set consisting of samples whose
class labels are known is required. The training set consisting of samples of attributes
and associated class labels is used to build a classification model, which is subsequently
applied to samples with unknown class labels. A learning algorithm is employed to build a
model that estimates the relationship between the attributes and class label of the training
data. The model generated by a learning algorithm should both fit the input data well and
correctly predict the class labels of samples that it has never seen.
Several well-known machine learning algorithms such as the decision tree, neural net-
work, and SVM belong to the batch learning paradigm which assumes that all training
samples are available before the learning process occurs. In contrast to batch learning, online
learning algorithms operate on a stream of data by deciding the present instance based on
past knowledge together with the latest available information. Formally, at each step t,
the learner receives an incoming sample (xt, yt), where xt ∈ Rd is a d-dimensional vector
representing the data, and yt refers to its class label. For binary classification, yt ∈ {−1, 1};
for multiclass classification, yt ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k ≥ 3. The classification model to learn
is parameterized by a weight vector w ∈ Rd. The learner first predicts the class label of
the incoming instance as yˆt according to some criterion σ(w · x). After the prediction,
the true label yt is revealed. It subsequently computes the loss ℓ(yˆt, yt) according to the
difference between the prediction yˆt and the revealed true label yt, and updates the model
by a certain strategy. The goal is to learn a model to minimize the online regret measured
as the difference between the cumulative loss of the online learning algorithm and the
cumulative loss of the best model, i.e.,
∑T
t=1 ℓ(σ(wt ·xt), yt)−minw
∑T
t=1 ℓ(σ(w ·xt), yt).
Different updating strategies lead to different online learning algorithms. We elaborate some
representative algorithms as follows.
B. Online Binary Classification
The seminal work of Frank Rosenblatt [49] proposed a simple model called perceptron.
The perceptron operates by assigning weights to incoming connections. At each learning
round, it takes the dot-product of each incoming value with a weight, and subsequently
verifies if it is over or below a certain threshold. It compares the predicted label yˆt =
7sign(wt ·xt) with the true label yt ∈ {−1, 1}. If yˆt 6= yt, the perceptron updates the model
as wt+1 = wt + ytxt.
As improvements to perceptron-like algorithms, many modern online learning meth-
ods [50]–[53] have been proposed over the past decades. They are partly inspired by
the maximum margin learning principle that has been applied successfully to batch mode
learning. Specifically, for the incoming example (xt, yt) and the algorithm’s weight vector
wt, the term yt(wt · xt) is referred to as the (signed) margin. Whenever the margin is
a positive number, we say that the algorithm has predicted correctly. However, we are
not satisfied with a positive margin value; we would prefer for the algorithm to predict
correctly and with a larger margin. Therefore, our goal is to achieve a margin of at least 1,
as often as possible. On rounds where the algorithm attains a margin less than 1, it suffers
an instantaneous loss. Typically, this loss is defined by the following hinge-loss function:
ℓ(w;xt, yt) = max(0, 1− yt(w · xt)) (1)
An example of such approach is the passive-aggressive (PA) algorithm [53]. In addition to
employing the maximum margin principle, PA maintains a trade-off between the amount of
progress achieved on each training round and the information retained from the previous
rounds. On one hand, the classifier should be updated whenever it misclassifies a new
instance. On the other hand, the classifier should not be changed too rapidly especially if it
predicts most of the previous instances correctly. Formally, it is formulated as the following
optimization problem:
wt+1 = argmin
w∈Rd
1
2
‖w −wt‖
2
s.t. ℓ(w;xt, yt) = 0
where ℓ(w;xt, yt) is the hinge loss defined in Eq. (1).
In addition, some variants of PA are proposed to use the soft-margin technique to handle
the non-separable and noisy cases. As an example, a variant named PA-I is formulated as
follows:
wt+1 = argmin
w∈Rd
1
2
‖w−wt‖
2 + Cxi
s.t. ℓ(w;xt, yt) ≤ xi and xi ≥ 0
where C is a positive parameter that controls the influence of the slack term xi on the
objective function.
The online learning algorithms above belong to the family of first-order methods, as
they only depend on the first-order information of the example. Additionally, the machine
learning community has studied the second-order online learning algorithms that use param-
eter confidence information to guide the learning process. A family of confidence-weighted
learning algorithms [54]–[56] assumes that the weight vector follows a Gaussian distribution
w ∼ N (µ,Σ) with mean vector µ ∈ Rd and covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rd×d. To classify an
instance x, it draws a parameter vector w ∼ N (µ,Σ) and predicts the label according to
sign(w · x). In practice, however, the average weight vector E(w) = µ is used for the
prediction. The model parameters, including both µ and Σ are updated appropriately with
the effect of controlling the direction and scale of parameter updates. The learner performs
online updates based on its confidence in the current parameters, generating larger changes
8in the weights of infrequently observed features. Our empirical evaluation in the following
indicates the advantages of learning with the second-order information.
As an example, the adaptive regularization of weight vectors (AROW) algorithm [56]
maintains a probabilistic measure of confidence in each component of its weight vec-
tor using a Gaussian distribution. The weight distribution is updated by minimizing the
Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence between the new and old weight distributions under the
constraint that the probability of correct classification is greater than a threshold. At round
t, when receiving (xt, yt), the model is updated by minimizing the following objective:
argmin
µ∈Rd,Σ∈Rd×d
DKLD(N (µ,Σ) ‖ N (µt,Σt)) +
1
2γ
ℓ2(µ; (xt, yt)) +
1
2γ
x
T
t Σxt
where DKLD(N (µ,Σ) ‖ N (µt,Σt)) is the KL divergence.
The above minimization problem can be solved with a closed-form solution as in [56].
This makes AROW quite fast as it does not need to invoke any optimization routine for
updating.
C. Online Multiclass Classification
The intrusion detection task occasionally requires the discrimination of attack type,
instead of only distinguishing attacks from normal actions. Compared to the aforementioned
binary classification, online multiclass classification operates over the same sequence of data
samples (x1, y1), . . . , (xT , yT ), but differs in that the choice of labels has more than two
odds, i.e., yt ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k ≥ 3. Unlike binary classification that represents the model
with a weight vector w ∈ Rd, the multiclass model contains a k× d matrix W, whose ith
row can be considered as the model for the ith class. Specifically, the compound weight
W is composed as follows:
W =


w1
w2
...
wk

 (2)
Given an input xt, the online multiclass algorithm predicts the label as the index asso-
ciated with the largest prediction value, i.e.,
yˆt = argmax
i∈[k]
Wt,i · xt
where Wt,i is the ith row of the matrix W as shown in Eq. (2).
After generating a prediction, the learner computes the loss based on the true label yt
and the highest-ranked irrelevant label as follows:
ℓmc(Wt;xt, yt) = max(0, 1− (Wt,yt · xt − max
i∈[k],i 6=yt
Wt,i · xt))
The learner subsequently updates the model parameter Wt based on certain rules as those
described in [57], [58].
D. Cost-Sensitive Online Learning for Binary Classification
A significant trait of the intrusion detection task is the skewed distribution of classes. In
most cases, most of the classes are normal events. The misclassification costs of instances
9from different classes can be significantly different. The classical online learning algorithms
minimize the regret, or equally, maximize the accuracy. However, pursuing a maximal
accuracy may be inappropriate on imbalanced datasets because a trivial learner that simply
classifies all samples as negative could achieve a high accuracy, but is of little use in
practice. This renders it unsuitable for class-imbalanced datasets.
As a remedy for class-imbalanced datasets, the cost-sensitive classification differs from
the normal classification approach by considering the misclassification costs during the
training process [59]. In principle, a better performance might be obtained if the classifier
is tailored by the learning algorithm using the cost matrix. Over the past decades, substantial
research efforts have been devoted to developing cost-sensitive classification algorithms. In
online learning, cost-sensitive classification methods exist for the binary class case [57],
[58], [60]. The key is to change the hinge loss in Eq. (1) to incorporate cost-sensitive
measures and optimize such measures directly.
As an example, the cost sensitive online gradient descent (CSOGD) algorithm [60] is
proposed to maximize the sum of weighted sensitivity (the proportion of positive samples
that are identified correctly as such) and specificity (the proportion of negatives that are
identified correctly as such). Hence, it modifies the hinge loss function as follows:
ℓ(w;xt, yt) = max(0, (ρ ∗ Iy=1 + Iy=−1)− yt(w · xt)) (3)
where ρ is a predefined parameter related to the ratio of the number of negative samples
to the number of positive samples, and I is an indicator function.
The model is updated by:
wt+1 = wt − λ∇ℓ(wt)
where λ is a learning rate parameter and ∇ℓ(wt) is the gradient of loss function in Eq. (3)
E. Cost-Sensitive Online Learning for Multiclass Classification
Despite being studied extensively for binary classification problems, cost-sensitive online
learning has been rarely examined for the multiclass case, even though the imbalanced
class distribution prevails in real-world applications. This particularly applies to industrial
control systems where the attacks, with various subclasses, comprise only a small part of
all events. As the sensitivity, specificity, and other class-sensitive metrics are defined for
binary classification, the aforementioned cost-sensitive learning technique cannot be applied
to the multiclass case. We thus propose a cost-sensitive online learning algorithm that can
solve the multiclass classification problem.
Suppose that there are k classes. We use a k × d matrix W as defined in Eq. (2) to
represent the model. To define the cost of misclassification, we use a k × k matrix C in
which the diagonal elements represent the cost of correct prediction (they are set to zero),
and the off-diagonal elements c(i, j) > 0, i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, i 6= j denote the cost of
misclassifying a sample of the ith class to the jth class. Given an example x, we define
the most possible misclassified class as follows:
p = argmax
i∈[k],i 6=yt
Wt,i · xt
The loss on this example is defined as follows:
ℓmc(Wt;xt, yt)) = max(0, c(yt, p)− (Wt,yt · xt −Wt,p · xt)) (4)
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Algorithm 1 Adaptive regularized cost-sensitive multiclass online learning (ARCSMC).
1: Input: A sequence of samples (xt, yt) where xt ∈ Rd, yt ∈ {1, . . . , k} and t ∈
{1, . . . , T}; a cost matrix C; a parameter γ > 0
2: Output: A vector W ∈ Rk×d representing the compound model
3: Initialize: Set W0 = 0, Σ0 = I
4: for t = 1, . . . , T do
5: Receive an instance xt
6: Make the prediction as yˆt = argmaxi∈[k]Wt,i · xt
7: Receive the true label yt
8: Compute the most possible misclassified class as p = argmaxi∈[k],i 6=yt Wt,i · xt
9: Compute the loss as ℓt = max(0, c(yt, p)− (Wt,yt · xt −Wt,p · xt))
10: if ℓt > 0 then
11: Update the model as Wt+1,yt = Wt,yt+αtΣtytxt, and Wt+1,p = Wt,p−αtΣtytxt,
where Σt+1 = Σt − βtΣtxtx
⊤
t Σt, αt = ℓtβt, and βt =
1
x
⊤
t
Σtxt+γ
12: end if
13: end for
where c(yt, p) is an element extracted from the predefined cost matrix C.
Replacing the loss function of any online learning algorithms with Eq. (4) leads to a
multiclass cost-sensitive online learning algorithm. We specifically employ the adaptive
regularization of weights (AROW) [56] as the framework to derive a new algorithm,
namely the adaptive regularized cost-sensitive multiclass online learning (ARCSMC). This
is summarized in Algorithm 1. The evaluation of the ARCSMC algorithm is presented in
the next section.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
It is difficult to conduct the security experiment on real industrial control systems because
of the potential risk and downtime of services provided by the facilities controlled by them.
An alternative method is to simulate their functions in an isolated environment, also known
as the testbed, where experiments can be performed safely. In our experiment, we used two
testbeds to evaluate the performance of online learning algorithms. We start by introducing
our experimental setup, followed by discussion on the results.
A. Experimental Testbeds
The data used in our experiment are extracted from two testbeds developed by the
Mississippi State University’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Center.
a) Power System Dataset: The modern power transmission system, also known as
the smart grid, relies on field sensors such as synchrophasors for remote monitoring and
controlling. The synchrophasor data contain measurements such as voltage and current
phasor, as well as the status of system devices including relays, breakers, and transformers.
It is typically sampled at a high speed (e.g., 120 times per second [32]) and sent to a
processing unit with low latency. Such a configuration causes the system to generate a
large volume of data that demands real-time processing—an ideal scenario for applying
online learning algorithms.
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Table 1:Statistics of datasets used in experiment.
We used a testbed to explore the suitability of applying online learning methods to
discriminate malicious activities from natural power system disturbances. The dataset in-
cludes the simulation of 37 event scenarios including natural disturbances (8 events), normal
operations (1 event), and cyberattacks (28 events) in a two-line three-bus power system [37].
Two classification schemes are employed in the experiment: one is a binary classification
where the 37 event scenarios are grouped as either the attack (28 events) or normal operation
(9 events); the other is a three-class classification sharing the same setting as mentioned
above. There are 78,377 samples in the dataset. Each sample consists of 128 features:
116 measurements are generated by 4 synchrophasors, and 12 measurements are from the
control panel logs, relay logs, and Snort alerts (Snort is a network monitoring tool). The
sample size, feature count, and class distributions of this dataset are summarized in Table 1.
b) Gas Pipeline Dataset: This dataset is a collection of labeled command/response
streams from a simulated control system that models a gas pipeline used to transfer natural
gas or other petroleum products [61], [62]. The physical system comprises a closed-loop
gas pipeline connected to an air pump that pumps air into the pipeline, a manual release
valve together with a solenoid release valve used to release air pressure from the pipeline,
and a pressure sensor. Commercial PLC, RTU, and HMI are configured to control the
physical system to maintain a specific pipeline pressure value.
Artifacts of normal operations and cyberattacks are mixed randomly to compose the
dataset. Four categories of cyberattacks are included: response injection, reconnaissance,
denial of service, and command injection. The configuration details can be found in [61].
Unlike the setting above, our experiment on this dataset only involves a binary classification
task. It consists of 274,628 samples, in which 60,048 samples are attack related. Table 2
provides the statistics of this dataset.
As shown in Table 1, a disproportionate number of classes exist in all datasets. For
the Power System dataset, the number of positive samples representing attack events is
larger than that of normal events. This deviates from the popular belief that attacks are
rare in a system. However, it is noteworthy that for this dataset, the portion of each class
is determined by the testbed’s creator during simulation. In fact, regardless of the class
12
outnumbers, the class imbalance problem is prevalent in real-world applications. Further,
the algorithms to mitigate imbalanced classes do not rely on the meaning of a specific class.
Therefore, we are confident that the experimental results on testbeds described herein are
applicable to real-world industrial control applications.
B. Evaluation Metrics
We adopt the following metrics to evaluate the performance of online learning algorithms
for the intrusion detection task.
a) Cumulative error rate: The cumulative error rate is the ratio of the number of
mistakes made by an online learner over the number of samples received to date. Despite
its extensive usage in online learning studies, the cumulative error rate is inept to measure
class-imbalanced datasets, as it ignores the different costs of misclassifying different classes.
In an extreme case, one can create a trivial classifier on a highly imbalanced dataset (i.e.,
blanket prediction of the majority class) that exhibits a low error rate but is in fact of little
use.
b) Sensitivity: Sensitivity, or true positive rate, measures the proportion of positives
that are identified correctly as such (e.g., the percentage of attacks identified correctly by
the intrusion detection system). For a binary classification problem, let P denote the number
of positive samples, and N the number of negative samples. Further, let TP , TN , FP , and
FN denote the true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative, respectively.
The sensitivity can be calculated as follows:
sensitivity =
TP
P
=
TP
TP + FN
c) Specificity: Specificity, or true negative rate, measures the proportion of negatives
that are identified correctly as such.
specificity =
TN
N
=
TN
TN + FP
It is noteworthy that the sensitivity and specificity, by their definitions, are only applicable
to the binary classification test.
d) Weighted sum of sensitivity and specificity: The weighted sum of sensitivity and
specificity (abbreviated as “sum” hereafter) is defined as follows:
sum = ηp × sensitivity + ηn × specificity
where 0 ≤ ηp ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ηn ≤ 1, and ηp + ηn = 1. As a cost-sensitive metric, the weighted
sum is suitable for measuring a classifier’s performance on the class-imbalanced dataset.
The higher the sum value, the better the classifier. When the ηp and ηn are both equal to
0.5, the sum becomes the well-known balanced accuracy. In our experiment, we set ηp and
ηn to 0.5.
C. Benchmark Setup
The intent of our work is to establish a foundation for the application of online learning
to intrusion detection in industrial control systems. The benchmarks selected are thus state-
of-the-art online learning algorithms with distinctive features. We employ the SOL online
learning library [63] in our experiment for its good accessibility and efficiency. As SOL
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includes a number of online learning methods, only representative methods are reported
herein.
Specifically, the first-order online learning algorithms used in our experiment are as
follows:
• Perceptron: the classical online learning algorithm [49];
• ALMA: the approximate large margin algorithm [50];
• ROMMA: the relaxed online maximum margin algorithm [51];
• OGD: the online gradient descent algorithm [52];
• PA: the passive aggressive online learning algorithm [53];
• CSOGD: the cost sensitive online gradient descent algorithm [60].
The second-order online learning algorithms include the following:
• CW: the confidence-weighted learning algorithm [54];
• AROW: the adaptive regularization of weight vectors algorithm [56];
• SCW: the soft confidence weighted learning algorithm [64];
• ARCSOGD: the adaptive regularized cost-sensitive online gradient descent algorithm [60];
• ARCSMC: the adaptive regularized cost-sensitive multiclass online learning algorithm
presented in Section III-E.
The experiment is conducted on a PC with a 2.4-GHz CPU and 8-GB RAM. The key
parameters for each algorithm are chosen from a small range of values (i.e., 0.001, 0.01,
0.1, 1, 10, 100, 1000) on a validation set. The elements of the cost matrix described in
Section III-E are set inversely proportional to each class count. We shuffled the sample
order for each dataset randomly and repeated the experiment 10 times with new shuffles.
The average results and corresponding standard deviations over 10 trials are reported in
Table 2.
D. Evaluation of Binary Datasets
Table 2 reports the mean error rate, sum, sensitivity, and specificity, together with their
standard deviations of different algorithms measured at the last learning round on the two
binary datasets. Figure 2 depicts the variation in mean error rate and sum along the entire
online learning process. The running-time for each algorithm, i.e., the total time (in seconds)
consumed by updating the models, and generating the predictions is included in Table 2
as well. Our observations from these results are as follows.
First, the classification problem is complex as the error rates are high. This has been
confirmed previously [36], [37], where the classifiers tend to make mistakes on the rare
classes. As for the online learning algorithms evaluated in this experiment, their error rates
are approximately 30% in most cases, not differing significantly from those of the batch
models reported in [36], [37]. Considering the minimal time cost of online learning algo-
rithms (e.g., they can process hundred thousands of samples in tens of microseconds with
moderate computing resource), we conclude that online learning can detect cyberattacks
of industrial control systems more effectively compared to conventional batch learning
approaches.
Next, the sensitivity records are less than those of specificity. For example, the sensitivity
against specificity of the ALMA algorithm is 4.62% against 95.56% on the Gas Pipeline
dataset. This is to be expected, as for a class-imbalanced dataset, identifying samples of
the rare class (positive class in this case) is more difficult than that of the majority class
(negative class). A classifier trained under this setting is more likely to err on the positive
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Table 2: Experimental results on the binary datasets showing the mean (in terms of
percentage) and standard deviation (in parentheses) of different metrics over 10 trails.
samples, rendering the metric for measuring the correctly identified positive samples, i.e.,
the sensitivity record, low. Because an intrusion detection system focuses more on the
percentage of real attacks that are correctly identified, one should focus on promoting the
performance in terms of sensitivity in practice.
Finally, by examining the values of sensitivity, specificity, and their weighted sum,
we discovered that the two cost-sensitive online learners, i.e., CSOGD and ARCSOGD,
outperform the others that do not apply the cost-sensitive learning schema in most cases.
This suggests that it is effective to apply cost-sensitive algorithms on the intrusion detection
task for industrial control systems.
E. Evaluation of Multiclass Datasets
We further evaluate the performance of online learning algorithms for multiclass classifi-
cation in terms of their error rates and cost-sensitive metrics. As metrics such as sensitivity
and specificity are for the binary classification test, we adapted for the multiclass dataset
by treating one class as positive and all other classes as negative. We calculated the cost-
sensitive metrics for each class as such, and reported them in Table 3 and Figure 3.
Similar to the result of binary datasets, the cost-sensitive learning algorithm (ARCSMC)
generally outperforms regular online learners in terms of the weighted sum of sensitivity
and specificity. This again indicates the necessity of applying cost-sensitiveness for the
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Fig. 2: The variation in evaluation metrics along the entire online learning process on the
binary datasets.
class-imbalanced problem. As shown, SCW achieves the lowest error rate, at the cost of
low sensitivity values on two minority classes. This indicates that SCW tends to classify
all samples as the majority class. From a practical standpoint, such a classifier is not very
helpful though it demonstrates a low error rate. Therefore, we conclude that ARCSMC is
better than SCW when applied to detect the few but significant intrusion events in industrial
control systems.
V. CONCLUSION
We herein explored the viability of applying online learning algorithms to perform
intrusion detection in industrial control systems. We began by a brief review of the industrial
control systems, the cyberthreats they experienced, and the intrusion detection methods,
especially those based on machine learning techniques. We highlighted that because the
industrial control systems require real-time response and uninterrupted operations, any
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Table 3: Experimental results on the Power System multiclass dataset describing the mean
(in terms of percentage) and standard deviation (in parentheses) of different metrics over
10 trails..
algorithms that they employ to detect attacks should be efficient, scalable, and suitable
for processing data stream. Online learning algorithms satisfy only these requirements. We
subsequently introduced several state-of-the-art online learning methods, and especially the
cost-sensitive online classification that could be used to improve the prediction accuracy
of the rare but significant attack events. We applied the cost-sensitive learning scheme
to AROW [56] to derive a new method—the adaptive regularized cost-sensitive multiclass
online learning (ARCSMC). The experimental results indicated that the cost-sensitive online
learning algorithms, in particular the proposed ARCSMC, are both effective and efficient
for detecting cyberattacks in industrial control systems.
For future work, we wish to extend our experiments to a more substantial size dataset and
to more applications. This involves building new testbeds to mimic more industrial control
processes and simulating more cyberattacks with different communication protocols and
attack schemes. In addition, more online learning algorithms and classification schemes will
be studied. One possible solution is the online one-class classification that is particularly
suitable for problems where the majority of available data represents the normal behavior
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Fig. 3: The variation of evaluation metrics along the entire online learning process on the
Power System multiclass datasets.
of the system, whereas the data related to attack events are difficult to obtain. In conclusion,
our work serves as an initial attempt at applying online learning to detect cyberattacks in
industrial control systems.
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